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AKRON LAW REVIEW
the Constitution is what the judges say it is."' Regarding the fourth
amendment, the judges are having trouble saying what it is. Every
person's fourth amendment protection suffers as a result.
GORDON D. ARNOLD
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY
OF STATEMENTS TO PAROLE OFFICER-
MIRANDA WARNINGS
State v. Gallagher, 36 Ohio App. 2d 29, 301 N.E. 2d 888 (1973).
T HE OPINION handed down in this recent decision from the Montgomery
County Court of Appeals examined a question of first impression in the
courts of Ohio. The issue presented was "whether a parole or probation
officer is a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of Miranda
and thus subject to the Miranda requirements of constitutional warnings
to suspects during custodial interrogation...."'
The defendant, Gallagher, appealed from a conviction of armed
robbery of a 7-11 Store. He was tried without a jury and sentenced to
from ten to twenty-five years in the Ohio State Penitentiary. The state's
prosecuting witness, an employee of the store, was robbed at gunpoint by
two men of approximately $350.00. Although two patrons were also
present in the store at the time of the robbery, neither was able to
corroborate the employee's identification of the defendant. 2 Approximately
one month after the robbery, the defendant was arrested, and immediately
thereafter fully advised of his Miranda rights by the Dayton police. At
that time he executed a standard pre-interview form which listed all his
rights and which constituted an agreement whereby he agreed that any
statements he made thereafter were of his own free will.3 Four days after
the arrest, Mr. William Sykes, a parole officer who had been assigned
to the defendant after his release from prison on a previous conviction,
visited the defendant. During this first visit, the defendant declined to
make any statements concerning his arrest. One week later the defendant
was again visited by Mr. Sykes. During this meeting the defendant admit-
ted to him that he had participated in the robbery in concert with the
other robber. 4 At the trial of this cause, Mr. Sykes was allowed to testify,
53Address before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce, May 3, 1907, in ADDRESSES OF
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 185 (2d ed. 1916).
1 State v. Gallagher, 36 Ohio App.2d 29, 30, 301 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 32, 301 N.E.2d at 890.
4 Id. at 30, 33, 301 N.E.2d at 889-891.
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over defense objection, that he had met with the defendant on the two
aforementioned occasions, and that during the second meeting, the
defendant had confessed his participation in the robbery. In his testimony,
Mr. Sykes further stated that he had not advised the defendant of his
rights to remain silent, to have an attorney present, nor that anything
he said could be used against him.5
The defendant asserted two assignments of error: first, the refusal
of the trial judge to suppress the testimony of the parole officer concerning
the defendant's admission of guilt, and secondly, the failure of the court
to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant at the close of the state's
case.6 Since the second assignment of error relied on a favorable ruling on
the first, our discussion here will be confined to the first assignment
of error as was the approach taken by the appellate court.
7
The defendant argued two grounds in support of his first assignment
of error. The first contended that the court's admission of the probation
officer's testimony was in violation of the constitutional requirements of
Miranda v. Arizona.8 The second ground asserted that communications
between the parole officer and a parolee are privileged due to the
confidential character of their relationship. 9 The court, in a unanimous
decision, rejected both of these arguments and held that:
[s]tatements made by an accused to a parole officer, whose acquaint-
ance stems from a previous offense, concerning the crime with which
he is charged are admissible in evidence against him even though
such officer failed to inform him of his Miranda rights, where such
rights were explained to him at the time of his arrest.10
Although the court noted that there was a split of authority on this
issue in other jurisdictions, they distinguished those cases in support of
5 Id. at 30, 301 N.E. at 889.
6 Id. at 29, 301 N.E. at 889.
7Id. at 34, 301 N.E. at 891.
8/d. at 30, 301 N.E.2d at 899, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), where
the Supreme Court summarized its holding at 444:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow
but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless otherfully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
9 State v. Gallagher, 36 Ohio App.2d 29, 33, 301 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1973).
10 Id. at 29, 301 N.E.2d at 888.
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the defendant's argument from the present case. In State v. Lekas,12 the
appellant, a parolee under the supervision of an officer of the Kansas
State Board of Probation, was taken into custody by a police officer and
his parole officer. Neither the police officer nor the parole officer gave
the appellant the Miranda warnings at that time. During an initial
interrogation, to which the police officer was not a party, the parole officer
elicited an admission from the defendant. This admission to the parole
officer was received in evidence over the appellant's objection. 3 The
Kansas Supreme Court stated that "[u]nder the foregoing circumstances
the question, simply stated is whether the requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona [citation omitted], apply to interrogation made by an officer of
the Kansas State Board of Probation and Parole."'14 The court concluded
that the statutory police powers which could be exercised by parole officers
were equivalent to those granted to other peace officers,15 and held:
The Miranda decision places a duty upon the officers of the Kansas
State Board of Probation and Parole, when they are investigating the
commission of a fresh or new felony by a parolee, to comply with
the mandate in Miranda, if the incriminating statements they elicit
from a parolee are to be admissible as evidence in the prosecution
of the new offense. On the facts in this case the incriminating
statements made by the appellant to the parole officer were
inadmissible in evidence. 16
In State v. Williams17 the defendant was not given the full Miranda
warnings prior to questioning by his parole officer which occurred
immediately following his arrest. The Missouri Supreme Court held that
probation officers were required to give a parolee the full Miranda
warnings prior to interrogation involving the possible commission of a
fresh offense.18 People v. Gastelum,19 the third case considered by the
court in support of the appellant's contentions, involved admissions made
1I Id. at 30, 31, 301 N.E.2d at 889, citing People v. Gastelum, 237 Cal. App.2d 205, 46
Cal. Rptr. 743 (1965); State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 442 P.2d 11 (1968); State v.
Williams, 486 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1972).
12 201 Kan. 579, 442 P.2d 11 (1968).
13 Id. at 581, 582, 442 P.2d at 14, 15.
14 Id. at 582, 442 P.2d at 15.
5MId., citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2235 (1964), which provides:
The director and all other officers and employees of the Board shall be within
the classified service of the Kansas Civil Service Act, and all persons employed
under the provisions of this act as probation and parole officers shall have and
exercise police powers to the same extent as other police officers and such
powers may be exercised by them anywhere within the state.
16 Id. at 584, 442 P.2d at 16.
17 486 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. 1972).
18Id. at 474, and see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549, 280 (Vernon 1953): "The Board and
probation and parole officers shall have jurisdiction co-extensive within the boundaries
of this state and may make arrests of persons on parole anywhere in the state in the
course of their duties under this chapter."
19237 Cal. App.2d 205, 46 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1965).
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by the defendant to his parole officer immediately following his arrest.
Again the defendant was not advised of his rights prior to the interroga-
tion. The court held that it was reversible error to admit the defendant's
admission into evidence. 20 The foregoing cases were distinguished by the
court from the present case by pointing out that in each of these cases
the defendant was not given the full Miranda warning at any time
prior to the questioning by the parole officer.
2
'
In holding that the parole officer was not subject to the Miranda
requirements of constitutional warnings, the court cited a number of
decisions from other jurisdictions in support of their view. 22 The cases
cited by the court in support of what they considered to be the majority
view demonstrates the extreme paucity of controlling precedent in this
area of the law. Further, it becomes apparent upon examination of these
decisions, that the court gave little weight to the significant distinctions
between them and the present case. The decision in State v. 
Johnson23
focused on the status and duties of a parole officer and the circumstances
at the time of questioning. In this case the parole officer on his own
initiative went to the defendant's home to question him concerning the
issuance of a bad check. No Miranda warnings were given. At that time
the defendant was under the supervision of the South Dakota Board of
Pardons and Paroles. When questioned, the defendant admitted issuing the
check and this admission was allowed to be presented in court as part of
the parole officer's testimony.2
4 The South Dakota Supreme Court held:
"Miranda warnings do not have to be given in all interrogations. They
must be given prior to 'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." (citing Miranda). Neither
of these compelling factors is present here. LeVake [parole officer]
was not a law enforcement officer within the spirit or meaning of
Miranda, People v. Ronald W. [citation omitted], and he did not take,
or have, defendant in custody.
25
The second case cited by the court as persuasive authority for their
decision was People v. Ronald W.
2 6 Here, the defendant, a parolee,
appeared voluntarily at his probation officer's office seeking help with a
narcotics problem. The defendant was questioned by the parole officer,
20 Id. at 209, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
21State v. Gallagher, 36 Ohio App.2d 29, 31, 301 N.E.2d 888, 889 (1973).
22Gilmore v. People, 171 Colo. 358, 467 P.2d 828 (1970); Nettles v. State, 248 So.2d
259 (Fla. App. 1971); People v. Ronald W., 24 N.Y.2d 732, 249 N.E.2d 882, 302
N.Y.S.2d 260 (1969); State v. Johnson, 202 N.W.2d 132 (N.D. 1972).
23 202 N.W.2d 132 (N.D. 1972).
24 Id. at 133.
25Id., citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Ronald W., 24
N.Y.2d 732, 249 N.E.2d 882, 302 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1969).
26 24 N.Y.2d 732, 249 N.E.2d 882, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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without the Miranda warnings, concerning the presence of needle marks
on his arm. The defendant admitted that he had been purchasing and
using heroin and this confession was admitted as evidence in a proceeding
to revoke the defendant's probation. He was found to have violated the
terms of his probation and was confined to prison. 27 The New York
Appellate Court rejected the defendant's contention that he was entitled
to receive the warnings announced in Miranda prior to being questioned
by the probation officer and stated:
[t]he questioning of the appellant was hardly the sort of incommuni-
cado, police dominated atmosphere of custodial interrogation and
overbearing of the subjects' will at which the Miranda rule was
aimed. The clearly stated objectives of education and rehabilitation
which are always paramount in the relationship between the proba-
tion officer and the probationer... are totally foreign to the elements
the Supreme Court addressed itself to in Miranda.2 8
The case of Nettles v. State29 is the only case cited by the court in
support of its holding which approximates the fact pattern in the present
case. There the appellant was found guilty of robbery. He appealed that
conviction on the ground that the court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence of a confession made by him to a probation officer who
had failed to give the Miranda warnings. In a situation similar to the
present case, the confession was made to the parole officer six days after
a waiver of his Miranda rights was given to a police detective immediately
following his arrest.3 0 In upholding the conviction, the Florida Appellate
Court founded its decision on the theory of "constructive custody."3'
They pointed out:
[tihe defendant was in constructive custody and he had agreed to
abide by certain rules and restrictions as condition for his probation.
He waived his right to his constitutional Miranda warnings when
he accepted probation and his waiver continues in effect even on
a new and fresh crime as regards his probation officer.32
In his dissenting opinion in Nettles Judge Mann noted that the holding of
the majority was not supported by the cited cases in that they presented the
question of "whether an admission to a probation supervisor might be
introduced in a proceeding for revocation of probation without proof
27 Id. at 733, 734, 249 N.E.2d at 883, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
28 Id. at 734, 735, 249 N.E.2d at 883,884, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 261, 262 citing N.Y. CODECRIM. PROC. § 936; Williams v. N.Y., 337 U.S. 241 (1949); People v. Peace, 18
N.Y.2d 230 (1966).29 Nettles v. State, 248 So.2d 259 (Fla. App. 1971).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 260, citing People v. Ronald W., 24 N.Y.2d 732, 249 N.E.2d 882, 302 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1969); See U.S. ex rel., Bishop v. Brierly, 288 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1968);Gilmore v. People, 171 Colo. 358, 467 P.2d 828 (1970); People v. Parks, 110 Ill.
App.2d 455, 249 N.E.2d 720 (1969).
32 Id.
[Vol. 7:2
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of compliance with Miranda.33 In distinguishing this question from
that presented in Nettles he stated:
But whether that same admission can be admitted at the defendant's
trial for the subsequent offense-question now before us-is a
different matter. Such a proceeding is independent of the probation
revocation proceeding unless, as the majority imply, acceptance of
probation carries with it an implied waiver of constitutional rights
while probation continues. It is doubtful that even an express waiver
of constitutional rights in future cases could be upheld, but we need
not contemplate that. I think it clear that there is no waiver of the
Fifth Amendment by implication.34 [emphasis added].
He further indicated what he believed to be the better view:
I think that the proper rule is that in a proceeding for revocation of
probation or parole it need not be shown that Miranda was followed,
but that in a prosecution for a separate offense it must be shown
either that the interrogation was not in a custodial setting or that
the accused knew the rights he was waiving. 35 [emphasis added].
Judge Mann's distinctions in the Nettles case are applicable to the
present case insofar as they point to the significant deficiencies in
the cases cited by the Ohio Appellate Court in support of their decision.
In People v. Ronald W.3 6 the action was a proceeding to revoke a
probation where the defendant had not been arrested and was not in
custody, but had freely come to the parole officer seeking help as a
friend.3 7 State v. Johnson3 8 may also be distinguished from the present
case in that the interrogation there did not take place after arrest while
the defendant was in custody, but may be characterized as an informal
interrogation which took place at the defendant's home.
39
Commentators have pointed out that the full impact and breadth of
the Miranda decision may not be definitized for years as state and lower
federal courts rely on each other's decisions to determine its full
implications. 40 Decisions which have restricted the application of Miranda
only to police officers have been rendered in Ohio
4
' and a number of
33Nettles v. State, 248 So.2d 259, 260 (Fla. App. 1971) (Mann, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 261.
35 Id.
36 24 N.Y.2d 732, 302 N.Y.S.2d 260, 249 N.E.2d 882 (1969).
37 Id.
38202 N.W.2d 132 (N.D. 1972).
39 Id.
40 Graham, What Is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Application
of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59, 61 (1967). See generally Sable,
Miranda Warnings in Other Than Police Custodial Interrogations, 21 CLEv. ST. L.R.
135 (1972); Comment, Custodial Interrogation, 35 TENN. L. REv. 604 (1968).
41 State v. Bolen, 27 Ohio St.2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971); State v. Peoples, 28 Ohio
App.2d 162, 275 N.E.2d 626 (1971).
RECENT CASESWinter, 1974]
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other jurisdictions. 42 In Ohio v. Peoples,4 the Ohio Court of Appeals held
that "[a] person not a police officer, or not acting in concert with or at
the request of police authority, is not required to extend constitutional
warnings prior to the soliciting of an incriminating statement."44 They
further noted that "[p]rivate security officers or private detectives are not
officers of the law in such capacity that they have to render a constitu-
tional warning precedent to the taking of a statement in the nature of a
confession." 4 This same restrictive view was sustained by the Ohio
Supreme Court when applied to questions asked of a suspected thief by
an employee of a merchant in State v. Bolan.46 These foregoing cases, the
present decision, and those decisions cited therein as authority indicate
a restrictive trend in the interpretation and application of Miranda by the
courts. This restrictive and narrowing trend seems to run contrary to
the spirit and intent of Miranda which is indicated in the following
excerpt from that decision:
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves
to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused
of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege
against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and
effectively apprised of his rights and exercise of those rights must
be fully honored. 47
This expansive spirit indicated in Miranda was affirmed in Mathis v.
U.S.," a decision which a preponderance of jurisdictions including Ohio
seem to have ignored in their recent decisions. In that case the petitioner
was incarcerated in a state prison and was questioned by an internal
revenue agent concerning the petitioner's tax returns as part of a routine
42 People v. Morehod, 45 Ill.2d 326, 259 N.E.2d 8 (1970); People v. Morgan, 24
Mich. App. 660, 180 N.W.2d 842 (1970); Schaumberg v. State, 83 Nev. 372, 432
P.2d 500 (1967); People v. Frank, 275 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1966).
4328 Ohio App.2d 162, 275 N.E.2d 626 (1971).
- Id., 275 N.E.2d at 628.
45 Id.
4627 Ohio St.2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839, 840 (1971), where the Ohio Supreme Court held:
Where... an employee of a merchant has detained a person whom he has
probable cause to believe has unlawfully taken items offered for sale by the
mercantile establishment, an admission or confession made during such detentionis not rendered inadmissible by the failure of such employee to fully explain to
such detained person those constitutional rights set forth in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
48Mathis v. U.S., 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
[Vol. 7:2
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tax investigation. The petitioner was not given the Miranda warnings. He
was convicted on two counts of filing false claims against the Government
and was sentenced to thirty months imprisonment. The conviction rested
upon evidence admitted as a result of the statements made to the
government agent. The petitioner objected to the introduction of this
evidence, and on appeal grounded his assignment of error solely on
Miranda. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the lower
court's decision. In attempting to avoid Miranda the government argued
first that the questions were asked as part of a routine tax investigation
and not as part of a criminal proceeding, and secondly, that the petitioner
had not been incarcerated by those questioning him, but was there for
a separate offense.4 These arguments were rejected by the Court stating
that the distinctions were "too minor and shadowy to justify a departure
from the well-considered conclusions of Miranda with reference to
warnings to be given to a person held in custody." 5
Viewed in light of the Miranda and Mathis decisions, the present
case and the decisions of other jurisdictions represent a clear trend toward
narrowly construing and applying the Miranda warning mandate. The
present case clearly falls within the scope and spirit of the Mathis
interpretation of the Miranda requirements in three respects. First, the
interrogation in both instances occurred while the defendant was in
custody. Secondly, the questioning in Mathis was made pursuant to
a civil investigation while the questioning in the present case concerned
possible criminal charges. Finally, the parole officer in the present case
ostensibly appears to be more nearly the equivalent of a peace officer
than does the internal revenue agent in the Mathis decision. Although
Ohio statutes 5- do not expressly equate parole officers with peace
officers as is the case in other jurisdictions, 2 the parole officer in Ohio
is elevated to the status of a peace officer in certain situations.53 These
foregoing reasons seem to indicate a severe departure from the direction
initiated by the Supreme Court in Mathis toward a more pervasive
application of the Miranda requirements.
The court summarily rejected the appellant's second ground for his
first assignment of error-that the relationship of parole officer and
49 Id. at 2-4.
50 Id. at 4.
5 Omo REVISED CODE § 2301.31 (Page 1954).
52 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2235 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549.280 (Vernon 1953).
53 OHo REvIsED CODE § 2301.31 (Page 1954) which provides:
For violation of the conditions of parole, as defined by section 2968.01 of the
Revised Code, or of the rules and regulations governing persons on parole, any
county probation officer may arrest a person on parole in the custody of the
county department of probation provided for in section 2301.27 of the Revised
Code with which such officer is connected. Upon the written order of the chief
probation officer of the county. department having custody of a person on parole
violating such conditions, rules, and regulations, any probation officer, or any
sheriff, constable, or police officer shall arrest such person.
Winter, 1974]
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parolee is a privileged one. 54 Although this point seems to be arguable as
a practical matter, those relationships which are considered privileged
are carefully controlled by statute in Ohio,5 and the Ohio decisions
interpreting the statutes have narrowly construed them.5 In the recent
decision of State v. Halleck,57 the defendant claimed a confidential
relationship between him and his parole officer.5 The Ohio Appellate
Court rejected this argument and stated that "R.C. 2317.02 states
what are privileged communications and acts. The relationship claimed
here to be a confidential one is not listed therein."5 9 The appellant's
second ground of error was therefore properly rejected by the court
in light of this established precedent.
In conclusion, it appears that with this decision, Ohio has joined
a growing majority of jurisdictions which have confined the effect of
Miranda solely to police interrogations. This trend appears to be adverse
to the spirit and intent of Miranda and the liberal interpretation given
to it in the Mathis decision. It is therefore unlikely that this trend will
abate in the absence of a definitized decision by the Supreme Court
defining the scope of the Miranda requirements and enumerating with
specificity those situations where it must be applied.
60
THOMAS A. TREADOmN
54 State v. Gallagher, 36 Ohio App.2d 29, 33, 34, 301 N.E.2d 888, 891 (1973).
55 OHio REVISED CODE § 2317.02 (Page 1954).
5 
sState v. Halleck, 24 Ohio App.2d 74, 263 N.E.2d 917 (1970); see Weis v. Weis,
147 Ohio St. 418, 76 Ohio App. 483, 65 N.E.2d 300 (1947).
57 24 Ohio App.2d 74, 263 N.E.2d 917 (1970).
58 Id. at 81, 263 N.E.2d at 922.
59 Id.
60 The U.S. Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to review the scope of the
Miranda requirements. Two questions relevant to the Gallagher case will be examined:
(1) whether the Miranda interrogation standards are too restrictive in excluding
admissions, and (2) whether these standards are mandated by the United States
Constitution. Michigan v. Tucker, cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Dec. 4,
1973) (No. 73-482).
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